By Nathan Spurgeon
This article profiles the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which existed from 1969 to 1997, when it was dissolved following a negotiated peace agreement with the British Government, known as the Good Friday Agreement, in April 1998. To profile the IRA, the article examines the root causes underlying the IRA’s insurgency, its political and military organizations and their activities, the British Government’s counterinsurgency campaign against the IRA, how the IRA’s insurgency was resolved, and an update on the situation in Northern Ireland from 1998 to 2024.
Introduction
The Irish Republican Army, commonly referred to as the IRA, found its origins following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1920 which separated Ireland so that Northern Ireland would remain inside the rule of Great Britain (Duerr, 2023, p. 404). The IRA aligned with the political party ‘Fienna Fail’, who also opposed the treaty, but they were both defeated by pro-treaty forces in the 1922 to 1923 Irish Civil War, which upheld the treaty’s amendments (Duerr, 2023, p. 404). Following this defeat, the IRA resurfaced in 1969 due to a mass civil rights movement and a range of protests, which spurred a revival of terrorist activity (Lippman, 2018, p. 118). Alongside having various offshoot organizations, such as the ‘Official IRA’ (OIRA), the ‘Provisional IRA’ (PIRA), the ‘Continuity IRA’ (CIRA), and the ‘Real IRA’ (RIRA), the groups officially amassed 488 terrorist attacks from 1973 to 1997, resulting in the deaths of 115 people (Duerr, 2023, p. 405). Despite some strands of the IRA seeking a peaceful unification of Ireland, variants such as the PIRA sought militant retribution of their cause.
Root Causes of the IRA’s Insurgency
Assessing the root causes of the IRA resurgence in 1969, it is apparent that the IRA were formed from a desire to free Northern Ireland from British rule, uniting Ireland, but also has ties to religion, with the Catholic IRA fearing the Protestant British rule could undermine their faith. Moreover, many of those who spurred to join the IRA experienced trigger points, or from experiences they related to, which ignited their extremist views to conduct terrorist acts.
Firstly, the initial component that led to the formation of the IRA was the British rule over Northern Ireland, and how the IRA aimed to unify Ireland through the use of terrorist tactics. This itself is an illegitimate grievance, as it seeks to employ terrorist violence rather than peaceful opposition or civil disobedience to achieve political objectives in a democratic society.
Second, this root cause also enables understanding of the IRA’s targeting selection as they reinforced their opposition to British rule by targeting symbolic British areas and people, like Westminster Palace and the Royal Family, the British military, who they sought direct confrontation with, and other targets of cultural significance to the United Kingdom (Duerr, 2023, p. 406). Following the deployment of the British military into Northern Ireland in 1969, the British Army’s tactics were harsh against the republican population, with numerous reports of mass screenings, house searches, and beatings by Army patrols, which aided in a breakdown of trust between the public and the British military (Hughes, 2013, pp. 113-114).
Third, this increase of militaristic hostility against civilians may have acted as trigger points for individuals to become radicalized against the British rule, as they could have directly experienced such violence, or aligned themselves with the struggles of individuals who had experienced such acts. The attacker responsible for the failed assassination of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Patrick McGee, revealed that he had joined the PIRA after his own experience of a British Army beating (Hughes, 2013, p. 116). This violence can be viewed as a legitimate grievance which spurred radicalism, as the clear degradation of their human rights and civil rights resulted in individuals turning to violence against the British.
Fourth, the religious aspect of the IRA is a root cause for the groups construction as well as encouraging individuals to engage in terrorism against the British. The Catholic IRA saw the Protestant British rule as a threat to Catholicism in mainland Ireland (Duerr, 2023, p. 405), and believed the sectarian Northern Ireland rule to be Protestant dominant while being discriminatory to Catholics in the region (Hughes, 2013, p. 101). Conversely, from the British perspective, Protestants in the United Kingdom were already wary of the number of Catholics across Europe, and feared that Catholics would forcibly change Britain (Duerr, 2023, p. 405). As a result, the root cause of the IRA was misunderstood by the British, who interpreted such terrorist activity as their already present fear of a religious takeover within the United Kingdom, leading both sides to see it necessary to defend their cause (Duerr, 2023, p. 405).
Ideologies of the IRA
In the ideologies that resulted following the formation and persistence of the IRA, two ideological themes are apparent. These are anti-colonial nationalism and socialism. Ideology in a terrorist group enables its participants access to continued motivation and influence, and provides these individuals with a sense of legitimization in their acts as they attempt to convert society to match their beliefs through terrorist violence (Sinai, 2024).
Firstly, originating from the root causes of the group’s resistance to the British rule over Northern Ireland, as well as Great Britain’s Protestant ties neglecting the Northern Irish Catholics, the IRA have formulated a strong nationalist and anti-colonial ideology. Evident within the IRA’s training manual, ‘The Green Book’, which expresses a strong anti-imperial and anti-British sentiment (Barboza, 2020), and the clear messages of unifying Ireland that was constantly carried alongside the IRA attacks. The nationalistic aspect of the IRA, was key to the IRA’s continued recruitment, as many recruits were captivated by the nationalism offered (Hughes, 2013, p. 116).
Second, socialism became a prominent aspect of the IRA’s ideology, as the IRA began to supplement their traditional nationalism with a radical leftist agenda that centered around the notion of a class struggle (Hughes, 2013, p. 102). From this perspective, they reframed their common struggle. While still concentrating of the goal of a unified Ireland, but the armed struggle against the British was replaced with a socialist revolutionary doctrine that emphasized cooperation and an engagement in improving various social conditions and movements (Hughes, 2013, p. 102). The initial revival of the IRA stemmed from protests relating to mass civil rights movements in Northern Ireland that protested the lack of economic opportunity, housing, and education for the Catholic populations (Lippman, 2018, p. 118). From this, the IRA began to build a base of support from the political left and workers in Ireland (Duerr, 2023, p. 404). By adopting this leftist outlook, it allowed the IRA to recruit numerous workers, and maintain support while economic conditions in Northern Ireland were not optimal for the working class.
Organizational Military Structure of the IRA
Dating back to the origins of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), during the Anglo-Irish war in 1919 to 1921, the IRA operated under a hierarchical, military-style organization under the leadership of Michael Collins, that allowed for the employment of a series of coordinated attacks against the British (Arthur, 2024). Upon the resurgence of the IRA, and specifically the Provisional IRA (PIRA), in 1969, the group followed this organizational trend, using hierarchy to direct effective attacks against unionist forces in Northern Ireland, as well as conduct terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. But, due to a restructuring in 1977, the PIRA’s organization became much more networked and cellular, allowing for sporadic and hard to track attacks. Overall, the varying organizational structure has shown the PIRA to possess a ‘hybrid’ terrorist organization; a cellular based, hierarchically organized authoritarian structure (Mayntz, 2004, p. 11).
Assessing the hierarchical aspect of the PIRA’s organization, the PIRA held numerous levels of direct control that was reminiscent of a military-style organization, with varying echelons of authority and decision-making entities that allowed for the coordination of attacks and the sustained terrorist activity against the British. The PIRA was spearheaded from a twelve-member executive whose positions were elected by a General Army Convention constructed with delegates from lower-level PIRA units across Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (McFillen, 2013, p. 51). This executive then selected a seven member Army Council which held the responsibility of daily management and decision-making and chose a Chief of Staff who oversaw the PIRA’s General Headquarters (GHQ), the GHQ then coordinated logistical acts, such as intelligence activities, finances, and propaganda (McFillen, 2013, pp. 51-52).
In the lower levels of the PIRA’s military structure, they were split into two distinctive ‘commands’, the Northern Command and the Southern Command, with each command possessing various local brigades to carry out direct actions (McFillen, 2013, p. 52). The Northern Command was tasked with all the PIRA’s Northern Ireland operations, with the Southern Command carrying out international operations and attacks, and support operations within the Republic of Ireland (McFillen, 2013, p. 52). This shows a clear demonstration of a hierarchical terrorist organization, from top to bottom the PIRA had clear direction and authority, with distinguished tasks and roles to allow continued terrorist attacks and warfare against the British and unionist forces.
Despite the successes displayed by the hierarchical structure of the PIRA, as will be discussed, in 1977, the PIRA were forced to adapt this structure to possess a more networked approach, prioritizing detached cells to protect against British spy infiltrations (Arthur, 2024). This reorganization was elaborated in a seized PIRA ‘Staff Report’, which unveiled that the number of successful infiltrations by British informants was leading to mass losses, and that the PIRA’s current organization was becoming untenable if they sought a continued movement (McFillen, 2013, p. 1). This transformed the PIRA from a hierarchical, military-type structure to a structure of independently operated cells who could only maintain communication to the central PIRA leadership through anonymous contact, these cells were known as ‘Active Service Units’ (attack cells), and replaced the traditional local brigades (McFillen, 2013, p. 1, 52).
The IRA’s Political Capabilities
Despite the PIRA not directly controlling a political party or entity, the political party ‘Sinn Fein’, was often viewed as the IRA’s political wing (Gregory, 2010), with Sinn Fein reiterating the views of the IRA, but aiming to achieve an Irish unification through parliamentary means. Although Sinn Fein and the IRA shared the same common goal, they still maintained differing opinions on how to achieve such unification. For example, the PIRA saw failed operations that killed innocent civilians as technical mistakes, like faulty weaponry or bad intelligence, while Sinn Fein maintained that these operations should have never been carried out in areas where there was a high risk to civilians (Jackson et al., 2005, p. 112).
This distinction was emphasized in the 1990s, as the British became more willing to negotiate and allow Sinn Fein’s political popularity in Northern Ireland into the Northern Irish parliament (Cowell-Meyers, 2024). However, this action allowed for Sinn Fein to demand and reiterate the IRA ideology and objectives in the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, where they instated the IRA message to the British that they had no territorial right to Northern Ireland, meaning that Northern Ireland would only remain in the United Kingdom so long as most of the population desired it (Cowell-Meyers, 2024). Therefore, Sinn Fein allowed the IRA to portray their ideology and messages through a legitimate source of diplomacy, which consequently led to the implementation of their demands into the Good Friday Agreement, that largely ended the conflict.
Effectiveness of the PIRA’s Hybrid Organizational Structure
Due to the PIRA’s adaptability and ability to adjust their traditionally hierarchical structure into one that incorporated a more networked approach, the PIRA have been considered by scholars as one of the ‘best-organized’ terrorist organizations of modern times (Hueckel, 2007, p. 3). By adding networked elements to their hierarchical structure, the PIRA were able to maintain operational effectiveness in an environment where they were susceptible to discovery and repression (Mayntz, 2004, p. 12).
The hierarchical system of the PIRA took advantage of the safe havens that existed in Northern Ireland, allowing the PIRA to conduct its highest volume of attacks and accomplish key strategic goals, like establishing a Northern Irish parliament and beginning negotiations with the British (McFillen, 2013, p. 61). Additionally, this structure enabled the PIRA to garner greater support from the Irish and Northern Irish populations (McFillen, 2013, p. 5). Although the restructuring of the PIRA in 1977 allowed for the organization to sustain its attacks for an additional twenty years and significantly reduce the number of personnel losses, the networked system lowered the overall number of attacks the PIRA could carry out as well as the attacks effectiveness, and reduced their general central control (McFillen, 2013, p. 62).
The British Government’s Counterterrorism Campaign Against the IRA
Throughout the period of ‘the Troubles’ (1969-1997), the British government adopted a predominately coercive counterterrorism structure to deal with the IRA insurgency. Coercive counterterrorism takes the form of a law enforcement, military, and intelligence response to counteract the threat, but, with a democratic state like the United Kingdom, the response will refrain from sending a large force to assist and will also implement conciliatory measures to ease tensions in the region (Sinai, 2024). Indeed, the British government’s response to the IRA threat was in line with this explanation. The military aspect of this coercive response took the form of the British Army, the law enforcement mainly consisted of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and intelligence mission was shared amongst a variety of agencies, including the RUC, MI5, and MI6. However, in line with the definition provided by Sinai (2024), the British government did attempt conciliatory measures to resolve the issue, culminating in the ‘Good Friday Agreement’, in 1998, which effectively ended the conflict.
British Military Organization in Northern Ireland
The main entity responsible for the British military response to counteract the IRA threat was the British Army, which was initially deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969 as a peacekeeping force (Bowlin, 1999, p. 1). This primary deployment was instated after it was concluded by the British government that the local police forces were incapable of containing the ensuing political violence in the area (McInnes and Kennedy-Pipe, 2001, p. 3), the presence of the British Army in Northern Ireland was known as ‘Operation Banner’ (Burke, 2015, p. 4). Although the IRA presented an immediate threat to the British government, it was widely that the threat of the Soviet Union eclipsed the IRA, meaning that the defense of West Germany was the most important security commitment for the British Army (McInnes and Kennedy-Pipe, 2001, p. 4).
Regardless of this decision, the British Army were still able to maintain capabilities and methods in Northern Ireland which included providing low-flying helicopters, foot patrols, watch towers, and military checkpoints (McInnes and Kennedy-Pipe, 2001, p. 5). The Army often patrolled Northern Ireland with soldiers and vehicles, while also conducting searches and acting as ‘snatch squads’ on potential insurgents (the Troubles, n.d.). Additionally, the British Army regularly acted upon a riot suppression mission, frequently being equipped with riot gear and using non-lethal weapons like rubber bullets and plastic batons (the Troubles, n.d.).
British Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was the primary law enforcement agency in the Northern Ireland region and was supported by the British Army when the Troubles began in 1969. The RUC forces were split into sixteen regionally aligned battalion sized divisions across Northern Ireland (Soule, 2012, p. 20). Originally the RUC possessed a paramilitary character until 1970, when it was remodelled to resemble police force structures seen throughout the rest of Great Britain (Britannica, 2024). Despite the involvement of the Army, the British government attempted that the RUC acted as the primary peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland (Britannica, 2024), this effort was ratified in the British government’s ‘Ulsterization’ policy (Soule, 2012, p. 53). The role of the RUC was to maintain civil policing alongside internal security (Cochrane, 2014), during the Troubles, the RUC played a primary role in suppressing the IRA threat.
British Intelligence Organizations in Northern Ireland
Assessing the British intelligence operations in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, the British intelligence community were split into three sections, the national level intelligence agencies, law enforcement intelligence, and military intelligence (Bowlin, 1999, p. 8). Until 1979, these agencies tended to work in an independent and decentralized manor, but, following the assassination of Lord Mountbatten and the Warrenpoint ambush of British soldiers, the British intelligence community realized their intelligence programs, in particular their human intelligence (HUMINT), needed to be upgraded and coordinated (Bowlin, 1999, p. 9). Following these events, the intelligence agencies were organized into regionally based Tasking and Coordination Groups (TCGs), these were spread throughout Northern Ireland and allowed for a joint effort in intelligence operations (Bowlin, 1999, p. 10).
The national level intelligence agencies include MI5, MI6, and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) (Bowlin, 1999, p. 11). In the British law enforcement intelligence, the RUC’s ‘Special Branch’, contained two main structures; Echo Three, which had the responsibility of running agents and informants, and Echo Four, which directed Special Branch’s undercover surveillance (Bowlin, 1999, p. 19). Lastly, within the British military intelligence, it possessed four associated intelligence organizations, the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF), the 14th Intelligence Company, the Special Air Service (SAS), and the Force Research Unit (Bowlin, 1999, p. 19). The MRF used former IRA members to identify current insurgents, but it was replaced in 1974 by the 14th Intelligence Company after current IRA members infiltrated its ranks, the 14th Intelligence Company then became the premier Army surveillance unit to track and identify insurgents (Bowlin, 1999, p. 23). Next, although a full commitment of SAS capabilities would have been seen as escalatory, the 22nd SAS Regiment was deployed to provide back up to the 14th Intelligence Company, as it specialized in intelligence collection and covert operations (Bowlin, 1999, p. 26). Lastly, the Force Research Unit was the army’s devoted HUMINT organization, as its mission was handling informants (Bowlin, 1999, p. 28).
The British Government’s Counterterrorism Campaign in Northern Ireland: Coercive and Conciliatory Measures
As previously discussed, British military, law enforcement, and intelligence measures sought to enforce coercive measures to counteract the IRA threat in Northern Ireland, but towards the end of the conflict, the British government began to adopt additional conciliatory actions which ultimately ended the violence and significantly reduced the terrorist threat. The essay will explain the British decisions to employ these various coercive and conciliatory measures, and why the shift from coercive to conciliatory tactics occurred.
Coercive Counterterrorism
Through Britain’s use of the Army, Royal Ulster Constabulary, and MI5 and MI6, their coercive counterterrorism (CT) measures aimed at using the British military, local law enforcement, and intelligence means to deter and counter the IRA’s terrorist threat in Northern Ireland. Initially, these coercive measures were implemented by Edward Heath’s government as he was reluctant to negotiate with the IRA terrorists, refusing to grant significant concessions to violent opponents of the British state (Leahy, 2020b). Through these coercive measures, the British government sought to contain the IRA violence in Northern Ireland, in order to preserve the regular political and socio-economic activities within the area (Leahy, 2020a). This highlights the concept that the British government understood that the IRA could not be fully defeated militarily, meaning that a strategy of containment underpinned its coercive actions. For example, through Britain’s intelligence campaigns against the IRA, it is estimated that their efforts prevent eight out of every ten Belfast IRA terrorist attacks by the 1990s (Leahy, 2020a).
Crucially, the coercive tactics had the primary goal of undermining and weakening the IRA from the start of ‘The Troubles’ in 1969 (Lawther, 2016). By deploying the British Army to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary, as well as their intelligence agencies, the British government sought to counter the terrorist threat with methods to negate their violence and restore order to the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland.
Conciliatory Counterterrorism
Although the dominant counterterrorism method consisted of coercive measures, the British government attempted to ease the tensions of the conflict, through diplomacy, political means, and socio-economic reforms. In 1973, for example, the ‘Sunnydale Agreement’ was submitted and introduced new provisions for power sharing between nationalists and unionists in a Northern Irish assembly (Dorney, 2015). Additionally, to appease nationalists and Catholics who opposed British rule, the British government disbanded unpopular unionist forces like the ‘B Specials’, redrew electoral boundaries to more accurately represent the Catholic population, and implemented housing and employment executives to remedy existing discrimination (Dorney, 2015). By the late 1980s, more diplomacy began to take place between the British government and the IRA influenced political party Sinn Fein, this resulted in ceasefire agreements in 1994 and 1997, and eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which effectively ended the conflict (Dorney, 2015).
Ultimately resulting in the Good Friday Agreement, which ended the conflict between the British and the IRA, British conciliatory measures included other policies such as political reforms, policing reforms, and prisoner swaps (English, 2023). The change to conciliatory counterterrorism largely took place in the 1990s. Factors to consider in the British change in CT tactics can be attributed to the following reasons, a realization that violence was not a sufficient strategy, international influence from countries like the United States, and a change in attitude from the IRA and Sinn Fein, who sought increased negotiations.
Firstly, due to the prolonged conflict, the British government understood that their coercive CT tactics were not an adequate solution to ending the conflict in the region, by the 1990s, they realized that this strategy had to alter to allow peace to ensue (Leahy, 2020a). Prior to this shift, coercive measures, such as military action, was proving to have countering results to what was originally hoped. For example, after an SAS ambush of an IRA location which killed eight IRA members, the number of new IRA recruits began to escalate in retaliation (History, 2020). Additionally, due to the change in the IRA’s structure, from hierarchical to cellular and networked, British intelligence began to struggle in placing informants into the IRA’s cells and leadership (Leahy, 2020a), reducing its efficiency. As a result, switching to adopt conciliatory measures began to be identified as a way to peacefully end the conflict.
Next, influence from international actors, such as the United States, was key in instigating the British CT switch from coercive to conciliatory measures to end the conflict with the IRA. Due to the large number of Irish-Americans pressing the White House for action in ending the violence in Northern Ireland, President Bill Clinton was active in his approach to bring the conflict to an end. In January 1994, Clinton granted Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams a U.S. Visa to the U.S., angering the British government (McLoughlin, 2023). This effectively provided Sinn Fein, and their nationalist movement, with political legitimacy in the face of the British, adding pressure on the British government to initiate further diplomacy with the Sinn Fein. Moreover, President Clinton was directly involved in beginning the Good Friday agreement in 1998, as the negotiations were chaired by the U.S. special envoy, George Mitchell (Dochartaigh, 2023). This shows that the pressure from a close British ally, the U.S., had spurred the British government to reconsider their coercive approach, eventually directly being involved in the ending peace talks.
Lastly, the political attachment of the IRA, Sinn Fein, also had an important role in Britain’s adoption of conciliatory counterterrorism measures. The British government had realized Sinn Fein’s popularity by the 1990s, as Sinn Fein had obtained approximately 30% of the Northern Irish vote, influencing British officials, and other conflict participants, to increase their engagement with them (Leahy, 2020a). Additionally, due to the public support from the U.S., the IRA began to see the gains it could make through political strategies, rather than violence, potentially leading to a change in attitude from the terrorist group (McLoughlin, 2023). These Sinn Fein political successes, combined with the growing fatigue to the conflict due to its long-lasting nature, caused significant political and social pressure on the British government, inevitably contributing to the British adoption of conciliatory counterterrorism measures.
How the IRA Insurgency Concluded
The conflict between the British and the IRA in Northern Ireland were concluded with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, but initial talks for this agreement began in 1991 (Steinberg, 2019). These initial talks excluded political parties who had ties to paramilitary organizations, like Sinn Fein, and instead solely included moderate parties like the UUP and DUP (Steinberg, 2019). Although these talks failed to bring an end to the violence, the British and Irish governments released the Downing Street Agreement in December 1993, which adhered to key principles of any Northern Irish settlement, and opened the door for the inclusion of Sinn Fein in peace talks, should Sinn Fein denounce the use of violence to achieve peace (Steinberg, 2019).
Negotiations continued with assistance from international actors and committees, but talks came to a stalemate in late 1997, but following interventions of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and U.S. President Bill Clinton, the Good Friday Agreement was settled on April 10th, 1998 (Steinberg, 2019). The Good Friday Agreement was based upon the principle of consent, where Northern Ireland would only remain apart of the United Kingdom as long as the majority of its population and government desired so, while also maintaining an end to the violence and that the IRA decommissioned their weaponry. This agreement ended the violence, but what actors spurred the peace processes in 1991 following over two decades of violence? The essay will discuss how Sinn Fein, and the British government, ultimately prompted the main actors in Northern Ireland to seek peace.
How Sinn Fein Contributed to Peace Talks
Despite the provisional strand of Sinn Fein supporting the violent actions of the IRA in achieving separation from the United Kingdom throughout the conflict, during the 1980s, the overall views of Sinn Fein began to shift their views about the long-term prospects for achieving republican goals through violence (Steinberg, 2019). This was partly due to the British ‘Ulsterization’ policy, which reduced the number of British military present in Northern Ireland.
This forced the IRA to target native Northern Irish security personnel and civilians, which began to negatively impact Sinn Fein’s electoral support (Steinberg, 2019). Consequently, in 1988, the Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams publicly announced this shifting perspective, by seemingly ruling out a military solution to the conflict, this then led to the beginning of secret meetings with the British government, contributed to the Downing Street Agreement, and influenced the American support and Visa grant from President Clinton (Steinberg, 2019). This ultimately led to Sinn Fein garnering political legitimacy through Northern Ireland, showing their value to the British government in being an entity capable of securing peace in Northern Ireland, leading to their inclusion and commitment to peace talks.
How the British Government Contributed to Peace Talks
Through the duration of the conflict, the British government was run by the Conservative Party, with Prime Ministers such as John Major and Margeret Thatcher, who did not publicly express support for the policies proposed by Sinn Fein and the republican agenda. But, this changed in 1997 with the election of a Labour Party government, led by Tony Blair. In his first weeks in office, Blair expressed his commitment to the consent principle in Northern Ireland, while also announcing plans for a devolved assembly, similar to policy in Scotland and Wales, to appease unionist political agendas (Steinberg, 2019). Blair was efficient in meeting with Northern Irish parties from both sides, including Sinn Fein, as he pursued peace talks immediately following his election (BBC, 1999). Tony Blair’s actions helped to pave the way for the Good Friday Agreement, by holding direct talks with unionist and republican parties, and by committing to policy agendas from both sides.
Conclusion
Through 1969 to 1997, the IRA insurgency was able to maintain its presence through Northern Ireland and across the United Kingdom and Europe, by conducting direct warfare against British forces and by conducting terrorist attacks in attempt to achieve their cause of unifying Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland and removing British control of the country. To begin with the IRA held a hierarchical structure, but the IRA were able to show their adaptability when they changed to a networked, cellular structure, following a large number of British infiltrations into their organization, which allowed their insurgency to continue.
In an attempt to quell the IRA insurgency, the British initially employed coercive counterterrorism strategies, through Northern Irish law enforcement, the British Army, and by using intelligence agencies, but inevitably had to switch their focus onto conciliatory counterterrorism measures, which ultimately concluded the violence with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The resulting Good Friday agreement was able to take place due to the increased Northern Irish support of, and the changing narrative of Sinn Fein, who realized the inability of violence to achieve their goals, and the attitude of the 1997 Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was quick to adopt and communicate his commitment to peace, and the unionist and republican policies.
The IRA and Sinn Fein After the Good Friday Agreement
More than 26 years have passed since the Good Friday Agreement was signed and it can largely be seen as a success, due to the levels of violence in Northern Ireland being relatively mellow compared to the scale of violence seen during the conflict (Rickard, 2023), but what has happened to the key actors during the conflict, like the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein?
Although security assessments in Northern Ireland have revealed that some networks of the PIRA still subside, they have maintained the ceasefire agreement signed in 1998 (Rickard, 2023). However, newer off-shoots of the IRA have been formed, and have the potential to again threaten the stability and safety of Northern Ireland. Formed in 2012, after a merging of the ‘Real IRA’, the ‘Republican Action Against Drugs’, and other small militant groups, the ‘New IRA’ are the predominant paramilitary threat in Northern Ireland who seek to continue an armed struggle against British and loyalist forces until a united Ireland is achieved (Franks, 2023).
While the group is significantly smaller in size to that of the PIRA during the Troubles, they still have been actively engaged in conducting terrorist activity within Northern Ireland. Some notable examples of New IRA violence has been highlighted with the bombing of a police patrol car in 2022, and the murder of journalist Lyra McKee in 2019, with the New IRA claiming responsibility for both (Rickard, 2023). The New IRA threat has showed that although the Good Friday Agreement was able to deescalate the threat of the PIRA through appealing to their political and social goals, it has been clearly ineffective in solving the complex socio-economic divisions that are deep-rooted throughout Northern Ireland as newer IRA groups are able to maintain a renewed terrorist threat within the state.
While the PIRA have largely subsided in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein have continued their presence within Northern Irish politics. The political party recently adjusted their political narrative to reflect Sinn Fein’s separation from their IRA past, and push their ideological basis towards a more conventional left-wing platform. This has enabled Sinn Fein to garner vast political successes across Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom (Pogatchnik, 2024). In elections seen earlier this year, Sinn Fein were able to obtain leadership of the Northern Irish government for the first time (Landow & McBride, 2024). Additionally, in 2024 elections for the House of Commons, Sinn Fein won more seats than any other Northern Irish political party, despite the fact they refuse to occupy these seats in protest to swearing allegiance to King Charles (Pogatchnik, 2024). Unlike the PIRA, this shows Sinn Fein’s adaptability through the conclusion of the Troubles and their commitment to achieving Northern Irish independence from Great Britain, and Irish reunification, through political, non-violent means. The successes they have achieved have reignited the calls for their goals of independence, taking inspiration from the independence referendum in Scotland, as well as the Brexit vote, Sinn Fein are actively pursuing their goal of Northern Irish independence and Irish reunification.
Could Brexit Reignite Calls For Irish Reunification And Renew Violence?
The Brexit referendum took place across the United Kingdom in 2016, with the majority vote casting that the UK should leave the European Union. But, in Northern Ireland, a majority of 56% voted to remain (Landon & McBride, 2024). The vote to leave was particularly concerning in Northern Ireland, specifically due to the Northern Ireland-Republic of Ireland border. More than 140 areas at the border are engaged in direct cross-border cooperation, sharing commodities and infrastructure such as healthcare, energy, and emergency services, and due to the Republic of Ireland’s membership to the European Union, a disruption to the border services could undermine the basis of peace in the region (Landon & McBride, 2024).
In response to this issue, the ‘Northern Ireland Protocol’ was negotiated. This ensured that border crossings from Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland were free, drawing a new border line across the Irish Sea for customs checks on goods coming into Great Britain, and allowing Northern Ireland to continue following many of the European Union’s single market regulations (Landon & McBride, 2024). Despite the intention of the Northern Ireland Protocol being aimed at relieving the tensions felt by Brexit, some observers feel it threatens the Good Friday Agreement.
For loyalists, the Northern Ireland Protocol has been seen as ‘driving a wedge’ between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom (Landon & McBride, 2024). This has led to a feeling of betrayal amongst loyalists, evident with their rioting in March and April 2021, as loyalist paramilitary groups like the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force were linked to these riots which injured 90 police officers (Hirst, 2021). Meanwhile, unionists and republicans see the Northern Ireland Protocol as a mechanism which is destabilizing the United Kingdom’s polity in Northern Ireland, by deteriorating relations between the two governments, and providing additional pretext for Irish unity (Diamond & Colfer, 2023). This was expressed by the New IRA, who stated, “Brexit has forced the IRA to refocus and has underlined how Ireland remains partitioned, it would be remiss of us not to capitalize on the opportunity” (Reuters, 2019).
But, with paramilitary organizations, and political parties from both sides being so opposed to Brexit policies, could this lead to a revival of political violence with the aim of separating Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom? Could a Northern Irish vote for independence and reunification actually take place?
With the founding and activity of the New IRA, alongside the continued existence of loyalist paramilitary groups, one could consider how long it may take for the two sides to find themselves in direct conflict as long as the sustained Brexit disparities exist. Meanwhile, to exacerbate this threat of violence, there isn’t a definitive explanation for what constitutes a wish for reunification or a mechanism for triggering a border poll and referendum within the Good Friday Agreement (Rock, 2023), despite the Good Friday Agreement being based upon the principle of majority consent. This could hinder Sinn Fein’s political progress in Northern Ireland, and spur increasing tensions throughout the state. The newly elected British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, has stated that a Northern Irish independence referendum will not take place during his Labour government’s fiveyear tenure (Gordon, 2023). This could brew additional hostility throughout Northern Ireland, generating tensions that the British government are not adhering to the Good Friday Agreement that ended the consequential conflict in 1998.
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About the Author: Nathan Spurgeon is enlisted in the United States Air Force as an active-duty Airman. He grew up in the United Kingdom, living in the Southern City of Winchester before obtaining his bachelor's in International Relations and Politics at the University of the West of England in 2021. Currently, he is enrolled in the Master’s Program at Capitol Technology University, Laurel, Maryland, majoring in Intelligence and Global Security studies. |
